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ABSTRACT 
 
The hypothesis of the natural resource curse has captivated the economics profession, and since 
the mid-1990s has generated a large body of policymaking initiatives aimed at dispelling the 
curse. In this paper, we evaluate how the effect of resource abundance on economic growth has 
changed since these policies were first introduced by comparing the periods 1970–89 and 1996–
2008. We disaggregate resources into oil, gas, coal, and nonfuel mineral resources, and find that 
disaggregation unmasks diverse effects of resources on concurrent economic and institutional 
outcomes, as well as on the ability of countries to transform their economic and institutional 
infrastructure. We consider resource dependence and institutional quality as two channels linking 
resource abundance to economic growth in the context of an instrumental variables (IV) model. 
In addition to exploring these channels, the IV framework enables us to test for the endogeneity 
of the measures of resource dependence and institutional quality in the growth regressions, 
paying particular attention to the weakness of the instruments. 
 
Keywords: Resource Curse; Resource Stocks; Resource Dependence; Rule of Law; Institutions; 
Economic Growth; Growth Regressions; Instrumental Variables 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Ever since Auty (1993) and Sachs and Warner (1995) postulated that the possession of natural 
resource wealth tends to lead to slower economic growth, the hypothesis of the resource curse 
has been in the spotlight of a large body of literature. The overall consensus appears to accept the 
presence of the resource curse between the 1970s and 1990s, although a number of more recent 
studies argue against it (Lederman and Maloney 2008). This rich academic literature has 
spawned numerous policymaking efforts aimed at dispelling the curse, ranging from direct tools, 
such as the taxation of commodity production, to more indirect tools, such as the establishment 
of managed floating exchange rate regimes and broader institutional reforms (Frankel, 2010). 
By many accounts, the results of these efforts have been mixed (Weinthal and Luong 
2006; Humphreys et al. 2007; Davis et al. 2001). Weinthal and Luong (2006) qualitatively 
evaluate the effectiveness of many implemented policies and conclude that only in a handful of 
countries have they been successful. Humphreys et al. (2007) focus on oil- and gas-rich countries 
and attempt to identify effective solutions based on the lessons learned from the experience of 
these countries. 
  In this paper, we argue that disaggregating resources into different types can shed light on 
the mixed economic outcomes achieved by resource-abundant countries since the early 1990s, 
when many of the policy initiatives aimed at addressing the curse were first introduced. We 
further contend that the resource type it possesses influences a country’s ability to transform its 
institutional and economic infrastructure. The hypothesis that resource types matter to 
development is not new: industrial characteristics, such as factor intensities and ownership 
structure, as well as institutional foundation required for the development of different industries, 
can vary substantially (Humphreys et al. 2007). In line with this hypothesis, Leite and Weidmann 
(1999) find that fuel and ores, unlike agricultural resources, have a negative influence on 
institutional quality and economic growth. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) and Isham et 
al. (2005) find that point-source (fuels and nonfuel minerals) and not diffuse (agriculture) 
resources have a significantly negative impact on institutional quality. But, unlike Leite and 
Weidmann (1999), these authors indicate that the effect of natural resources on economic growth 
(oil in the case of Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian [2003]) is positive.    3 
Our contribution to this literature lies in differentiating between resource abundance 
measures and resource dependence measures, which are commonly used in the literature as 
proxies for resource abundance (e.g., Leite and Weidmann 1999; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 
2003; Isham et al. 2005; Boschini, Pettersson, and Roine 2007). Resource abundance represents 
the stock of resources whereas resource dependence represents the importance of resource 
extraction to the economy, a measure that is potentially endogenous in the growth equation. The 
endogeneity can occur if, for instance, the growth rate of a country with stagnant nonresource 
sectors is dragged down by these sectors, turning the economy more resource dependent. 
Moreover, slow-growing countries may intentionally increase their reliance on the resource 
sector in their attempt to increase their output. In such cases, even if resource dependence per se 
has a positive impact on economic growth, failing to control for endogeneity may result in 
inconsistent coefficient estimates and in the false appearance of a negative relationship.  
Our measures of resource abundance come from Norman (2009), who constructs resource 
stock values in 1970 by combining the current reserves data with the production data between 
1970 and the date the reserves were measured. Although not completely exogenous, Norman’s 
(2009) measures are arguably closer to being exogenous than other available natural capital 
measures (Ploeg and Poelhekke 2010). Moreover, Norman’s (2009) data are available in 
disaggregated form, making our analysis possible. We take as a starting point the literature 
finding that mineral resources are the main culprit hurting development and consider the 
disaggregation into four categories: oil, gas, coal, and nonfuel mineral resources. 
Humphreys et al. (2007) identify a number of channels through which resource 
abundance affects economic growth. In this paper, we focus primarily on two channels: resource 
dependence and institutional quality. Resource abundant countries tend to be more resource 
dependent, relying on natural resource exports for a larger share of their GDP. This reliance can, 
in turn, lead to output volatility from price shocks (Ploeg and Poelhekke 2010) and price 
distortions that hinder the traded goods sector (Corden and Neary 1982). This in turn prevents 
countries from developing the strong export manufacturing industries that are the flagship of 
modern development strategies (Sachs and Warner 1995). At the same time, resource abundance 
may erode institutional quality by providing increased opportunities for corruption and rent 
seeking (Leite and Weidmann 1999; Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006) by encouraging the state 
to pursue policies beneficial to the resource extraction industry at the expense of other industries   4 
(Shafer 1994), or by creating rich elites that resist democratization and urbanization (Barro 1999; 
Ross 2001; Isham et al. 2005). 
The paper compares the effect of disaggregated resource types on the economic 
performance of countries between 1970–89 and 1996–2008. Doing so allows us to identify the 
heterogeneous impact of resources not only on institutional quality, resource dependence, and 
economic growth, but also on the ability of countries to transform their institutional and 
economic infrastructure, which is our primary goal. 
We use the instrumental variable approach to evaluate the potential endogeneity of the 
resource dependence and institutional quality in the growth equation. Whereas the instrumental 
variables approach can yield consistent coefficient estimates, this holds only if the instruments 
are sufficiently strong. In fact, the weakness of instruments, especially in the institutional quality 
regressions, is a common problem, which this study shares. We address the difficulties in 
interpreting the coefficient of the potentially endogenous variable by conducting a conditional 
likelihood ration (CLR) test (Moreira 2003; Shaw, Katsati, and Jurgilas 2010).  
Insofar as we distinguish between resource dependence and resource abundance and 
evaluate the potential endogeneity of resource dependence and institutional quality, our paper is 
most closely related to Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010), and 
Norman (2009). However, unlike Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) and Brunnschweiler and Bulte 
(2008), we investigate the heterogeneity in the effect of resource types on resource dependence 
and economic growth. And, unlike Norman (2009), who also disaggregates the resource stock, in 
addition to the institutional channel, we explore the resource dependence channel connecting 
disaggregated resource abundance to economic growth.
1 Moreover, unlike these authors, our 
primary interest lies in comparing the period that predates the introduction of policy shifts with 
the more recent period. 
We begin by estimating our regressions using an aggregated measure of mineral resource 
abundance from Norman (2009), obtaining results that are consistent with similar specifications 
in Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) and Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008). The disaggregation into oil, 
gas, coal, and nonfuel minerals paints a more nuanced picture. Oil hurts institutional quality and 
resource dependence, confirming the findings of other studies, but has no direct effect on 
                                                 
1 In addition, Norman (2009) divides disaggregated resource stock measures by GDP, doing which potentially 
weakens its exogeneity. Ding and Field (2005) also distinguish between resource abundance and resource 
dependence, but their main channel is human capital.   5 
economic growth. The impact of nonfuel minerals is manifested in increased resource 
dependence, but its effect on institutional quality or directly on economic growth is insignificant. 
Natural gas, in contrast, appears to affect growth through channels other than resource 
dependence or institutions. Comparing coefficients in the before and after period, we find that, as 
a whole, countries have not improved their handling of most resources. The notable exception is 
natural gas, whose direct effect on growth changes from significantly negative during 1970–89 to 
significantly positive during 1996–2008. It is also noteworthy that resource dependence appears 
negative but insignificant to growth in all specifications, similar to Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) 
and Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008). Neither resource dependence nor institutional quality is 
found to be endogenous, although the results with respect to institutional quality have to be 
interpreted with caution due to the weakness of instruments. Our results highlight the importance 
of disaggregation and the need to understand the relationship between resource type and the 
ability of countries to improve their economic and institutional performance. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the specification of 
the model and the choice of instruments. Section 3 discusses the results in detail, including 
evaluating the endogeneity of resource dependence and institutional quality, correcting for the 
weakness of their instruments and exploring alternative specifications as a test of robustness. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
We estimate two sets of instrumental variable regressions in order to evaluate resource 
dependence and institutional quality as two primary channels connecting resource abundance to 
growth. The first set of equations is: 
 
minxpt =  α1 + α2 open5060s + α3 pres70s + α4 eurfrac + α5 minpc + α6 lgdp70 + α7 invgdpt + 
α8 hct + α9 gpopt + α10 regional dummies + εminxp      (1) 
 
growtht = β1 + β2 minxpt fitted + β3 eurfrac + β4 minpc + β5 lgdp70+ β6 invgdpt + β7 hct + β8 
gpopt + β9 regional dummies + εgrowth1,       ( 2 )  
 
 
where we drop country-level subscripts, t corresponds to either old period or new period; minxpt  
is GDP share of fuel and mineral exports averaged over the period; openness5060s  is GDP share   6 
of trade volume averaged over 1950–69; pres70s  is presidential dummy; eurfrac is the 
proportion of population speaking a European language; minpc is either aggregate per capita 
stock of mineral resources or disaggregated per capita stocks of oil, gas, coal, and nonfuel 
minerals, in which case α5 and β4 are vectors; lgpd70 is log of real GDP per capita in 1970; 
invgdpt is GDP share of gross fixed capital formation averaged over the period; hct is average 
years of schooling averaged over the period; gpopt is population growth rate averaged over the 
period; growtht is growth rates in real GDP per capita averaged over the period; and  εminxp and 
 εgrowth1  are the corresponding error terms. 
The second set of equations is: 
 
 
rulet = γ1 + γ2 latitude + γ3 eurfrac + γ4 minpc + γ5 lgdp70 + γ6 invgdpt + γ7 hct + γ8 gpopt + γ9 
regional dummies +  εrule         ( 3 )    
          
growtht = δ1 + δ2 rulet fitted + δ3 minpc + δ4 lgdp70 + δ5 invgdpt + δ6 humant + δ7 gpopt + δ8 
regional dummies + εgrowth2,         ( 4 )  
 
 
where rulet represents the rule of law, and εrule and εgrowth2  are the corresponding error terms. 
We include conventional measures in the growth equation (similar to Ploeg and 
Poelhekke [2010]). Note also that resource abundance measures appear in both growth equations 
to capture pathways other than institutional quality and resource dependence (see also 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte [2008]). When disaggregated measures are used, we include all four 
measures of resource abundance side by side. The fraction of the population speaking a 
European language, eurfrac (a common instrument for institutional quality), serves as an 
exogenous proxy for institutions in the resource dependence equation and resource abundance; 
minpc, serves as an exogenous proxy for resource dependence in the institutional quality 
regression. 
The pool of instruments available for resource dependence is limited (Ploeg and 
Poelhekke; Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008; Ding and Field 2005). Similar to Brunnschweiler 
and Bulte (2008), we choose average openness in the 1950s and 1960s, openness5060s, and the 
presidential dummy, pres70, as our instruments. Average openness in the 1950s and 1960s is 
intended to capture both geographic and institutional barriers to trade, which would affect the   7 
degree to which abundant resources are exported. Using a pre-period value limits the 
endogeneity of this measure as well as its impact on growth other than through resource 
dependence—while lagged effects from technological or expertise gains may exist, they are 
likely to be minimal twenty to thirty years later. The presidential regime dummy is coded as 1 for 
countries whose executive branch is directly elected and 0 for other (e.g., parliamentary) regime 
types. In a parliamentary system, MPs must vote along party lines or risk dissolution of the 
government and a new election, which would cost them their jobs. Members of congress have no 
such incentive, and so the legislative agenda must pander to the local concerns of committee 
heads and the special interest groups that contribute campaign money. Since resource extraction 
provides local jobs and tax dollars and the resource sector is one such special interest group, 
public policy is more likely to be skewed in its favor at the expense of the rest of the economy, 
leading to greater resource dependence (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008). These instruments are 
found to be strong and pass the overidentification tests of excludability and underidentification 
tests of relevance in both periods. 
The existing literature on instrumenting for institutional quality is much broader, but the 
available instruments appear quite weak in these regressions. We chose the absolute value of 
latitude, latitude, and the fraction of the population speaking a European language, eurfrac, from 
Hall and Jones (1999), which are meant to capture attractiveness to European settlement and the 
degree of European influence, respectively. These two were the only instruments that passed 
both overidentification tests of excludability and underidentification tests of relevance in both 
periods. Other instruments including ethnolinguistic fractionalization, predicted trade share, 
European settlement in 1900, and settler mortality were evaluated but rejected on that basis.  
While it may be preferable to estimate the two first stage regressions simultaneously and 
then put both endogenous variables into a single growth equation as Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) 
do in some of their specifications, the available instruments are too weak to obtain consistent 
results in that framework. Since both first stages would have to contain the same right-hand-side 
variables, each one would have to contain both sets of instruments, diluting their explanatory 
power considerably. The already-weak instruments for institutional quality would also leave little 
independent variation between the two sets of fitted values, potentially resulting in 
multicollinearity issues in the growth equation. Hence, we adopt the framework in which the two 
channels are explored independently.   8 
 
3. INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 
 
In order to anchor our findings in the related literature that does not disaggregate the resource 
abundance, such as Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) and Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), as a 
starting point we use an aggregate resource stock measure. Our results in tables 1 and 2 are 
generally consistent with these authors, finding that resource abundance contributes positively to 
resource dependence, but is insignificant to growth once dependence has been controlled for. 
The standard growth regressors included as controls have the expected signs, although 
significance varies across specifications. Compared to the old time period, resource abundance in 
the new period has an increasingly negative effect on institutional quality (again consistent with 
the usual finding of a negative or insignificant relationship between resource dependence and 
institutions, e.g., Isham et al. [2005] and Brunnschweiler and Bulte [2008]), while its effect 
through other channels remains unchanged. These results support the qualitative findings of 
Weinthal and Luong (2006) and Humphreys et al. (2007), who emphasize the difficulties of 
implementing policy measures to combat the resource curse. 
 
Table 1: Aggregate Resource Abundance, 1970–1989 
 














  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
   1970–1989    
Rule of Law, 1996        0.444
a 
(0.27) 
        
Average Mineral Resource 





        
Norman Log Value of Fuel Nonfuel 










Notes: t statistics in parentheses;  *p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01; 
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Table 2: Aggregate Resource Abundance, 1996–2008 
 















  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Rule of Law, Average of 1996–2008        1.528
a 
(1.49) 
        
Exports of Point Resources, Average 





        
Norman Log Value of Fuel Nonfuel 









Notes: t statistics in parentheses;  * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01; 
a fitted value from previous column; complete tables in appendix 
 
 
Disaggregating the resource abundance figure reveals a more detailed picture (tables 3 
and 4). Oil seems to be driving the curse on institutions, having a significantly negative effect on 
rule of law in both periods while no other resource has any measurable effect. This suggests that 
oil abundance poses the most significant risk to institutional quality, confirming the findings of 
Leite and Weidmann (1999), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), and others. The effect of oil 
reserves on resource dependence is somewhat clouded by multicollinearity with gas reserves, but 
they are jointly significant in both periods and oil alone becomes marginally significant in the 
later period. There is no evidence of improvement between the two time periods, indicating that 
oil-rich countries have a particularly difficult time diversifying their economies and reforming 
their institutions. Indeed, oil’s effect on resource dependence is significantly greater in the later 
period, suggesting that countries with abundant oil reserves are becoming less diversified, either 
due to Dutch Disease effects or active attempts to develop oil extraction at the expense of other 
industries.
2 
Natural gas appears to affect growth through channels other than resource dependence or 
institutional quality. Moreover, the sign of the coefficient estimate in the growth regressions 
changes from negative for 1970–89 to positive for 1996–2008. This change is statistically 
significant in both sets of regressions (i.e., column 2, as well as column 4 in tables 3 and 4).
3 
This finding may be due to a variety of factors, from changes to the extraction industry as more 
countries develop the capacity to capture and export their gas reserves instead of flaring them to 
                                                 
2 p-value 0.04. 
3 The result holds even though the modern coefficient in growth regression in column 4 of table 4 is by itself 
insignificant. The p values for the coefficient comparison are 0.00 for column 2 and 0.01 for column 4.   10  
changes in price and volatility. In any case, it appears that countries rich in natural gas have been 
more successful in managing the impact of those resources than countries with other resources. 
Positive effects of aggregate resources on resource dependence appear to be masking a 
significantly negative effect of coal reserves on resource dependence equation for 1970–89. This 
result can emerge because coal is more commonly used for domestic consumption, only 
marginally entering into the export dependence figure.
4 If coal provides a source of cheap local 
fuel for generating electricity, it may even boost other sectors of the economy, hence reducing 
resource dependence. By 1996–2008, coal loses its significance to resource dependence, but 
begins to have a positive direct effect on growth, at least in the specification with an 
endogenously determined institutional quality (column 4, table 4). In both cases, coal is bucking 
the trend for other point-source resources, its effect having a significantly different sign from that 
of other resources and highlighting the need to look more closely at resource type in the resource 
curse literature. 
Nonfuel minerals show modest evidence of a resource curse. This is an aggregate of 35 
metals including gold, silver, iron, and tin. While a more specific measure, such as one that 
separates the precious metals, might seem preferable, there are too few countries with any given 
mineral resource to draw meaningful conclusions (particularly since the United States, Australia, 
and Canada tend to figure prominently among those countries). Nonfuel mineral reserves 
contribute positively to resource dependence in both periods and negatively to growth in the 
1996–2008 period (again in the endogenous institutional quality specification, column 4 in table 
4). Although nonfuel mineral abundance does not appear to have an effect on institutional quality 
in either period, the coefficient estimate for the more recent period is significantly lower, 
suggesting that countries with nonfuel minerals have similarly failed to insulate their institutions 







                                                 
4 According to the US EIA, in 2009 only 5.5% of domestic coal production was exported (US EIA [2]). 
5 p-value 0.02.   11  
 
Table 3: Disaggregated Abundance 1970–1989 
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Notes: t statistics in parentheses;  * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01; 




Table 4: Disaggregated Abundance 1996–2008 
 
  Exports of Point 
Resources, 
Average 1996–












  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Rule of Law, Average of 1996–2008        1.822**
 a 
(2.00) 
        
Exports of Point Resources, average 







        









        










        










        










        










Notes: t statistics in parentheses;  * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01; 
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Table 5: Change over Time in the Effect of Resource Abundance 
 
  Resource Dependence  Growth from Resource 
Dependence 
Institutional Quality  Growth from 
Institutional Quality 
Aggregate Unchanged  Unchanged Worsened*  Unchanged 
Oil Worsened**  Unchanged  Unchanged Unchanged 
Natural Gas  Improved*  Improved*** Unchanged  Improved** 
Coal Worsened**  Unchanged  Unchanged  Unchanged 
Non-fuel Unchanged  Unchanged Worsened**  Unchanged 
Notes: Wald test of the simple linear hypothesis that the corresponding coefficients in tables 1–4 are the same; “improvement” is considered a 
more positive effect except in the case of resource dependence where improvement is considered a more negative effect; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** 
p<.01. 
 
In no case do we find a significant effect of resource dependence on growth. This result 
concurs with the findings of other papers, such as Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) and 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), which separate resource abundance from dependence. The 
finding appears to suggest that a diversified economy has been of little benefit to growth in both 
periods, either because resource dependence has no effect on growth or because it has multiple 
counteracting effects. Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010), for instance, explain this finding by arguing 
that a positive effect on growth from the industry itself—whose profitability and ability to attract 
foreign capital might be a boon to the economy—is counterbalanced with a negative effect from 
increased output volatility.  
At the same time, this result contrasts with that of single-stage models, such as Sachs and 
Warner (1995), which generally predict a negative effect of resource dependence on growth. We 
investigate the possibility that the significance found in single-stage models may be due to a 
downward bias in the estimates due to the endogeneity of the resource dependence variable. To 
that end, we perform both Durbin-Wu-Hausman and C-statistic tests on all specifications (Baum, 
Schaffer, and Stillman 2007). In all cases, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity of resource dependence to growth, suggesting that no such bias exists (see tables A3–
A6). We also explore the possibility that the lack of significance in the two-stage setup stems 
from the information of loss due to instrumentation. However, when we use OLS to estimate the 
growth equation with the same explanatory variables (column 2 of tables A5 and A6) but without 
instrumenting for resource dependence, resource dependence remains negative and 
insignificant.
6 Moreover, the instruments for resource dependence are reasonably strong and the 
R
2 terms show that 50–60% of the variation in resource dependence is captured by the model, 
                                                 
6 Results not shown, but available on request; p-value is 0.17 for the 1970–89 period and 0.19 for the 1996–2008 
period.   13  
casting doubt on this explanation. We conjecture that the difference in the results is potentially 
due to the inclusion of our resource stock measures.  
Our findings lend support to the use of OLS regressions for testing the effect of resource 
dependence on growth. Nevertheless, using the coefficient of resource dependence in the growth 
regression as evidence for or against the resource curse is at best incomplete because resource 
dependence is one of many channels through which resource abundance can influence economic 
growth. Importantly, the use of the two-stage specification allows us to evaluate these channels.  
Similar to resource dependence, institutional quality also appears to have no significant 
effect on growth, except in the modern period with disaggregated resource abundance, where it 
has the expected sign (column 4, table 4). However in this case the interpretation of the 
coefficient of instrumented institutional quality is complicated by the weakness of the 
instruments, as can be seen from the low F-statistics (column 3 in tables A3–A6). Weak 
instruments are known to bias the standard errors of the coefficient estimate of the endogenous 
variable, rendering its interpretation invalid. We correct for this bias using Conditional 
Likelihood Ratio (CLR) test (Moreira 2003). The CLR reports the probability that the population 
coefficient for the endogenous variable is zero, and, despite the potential bias, the CLR statistic 
consistently confirms the significance or nonsignificance of the estimate. The corrected results 
confirm the lack of significance of the instrumented institutional quality (column 3 in tables A3–
A6). This result is consistent with that of Shaw, Katsati, and Jurgilas (2010) who find that 
corruption and bureaucratic efficiency measures are insignificant in IV regressions once the 
weakness of their instruments is taken into account, although previous authors who did not 
correct for weak instrumentation found significant relationships of the same sign (Shleifer and 
Vishny [1993], among others). Several factors might contribute to the lack of significance, 
including information loss from weak instrumentation and the use of a 1996 value to proxy for 
institutional quality as far back as 1970.
7 If the uninstrumented value for institutional quality is 
used in place of the instrumented one, it appears significantly positive at the 1% level in both 
periods. Similar to the resource dependence case, endogeneity tests provide no evidence that a 
two-stage framework used to instrument for institutional quality is necessary. However, the first-
stage results are sufficiently interesting in their own right to warrant a two-stage approach. 
                                                 
7 Note also that, as Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) show, the coefficient estimates for exogenous variables are 
unbiased, provided that the independent variation in the variable being examined is not the sole predictor of the rule 
of law, an assumption we are comfortable making given the number of significant conditioning variables.   14  
As tests of robustness, we include two alternative specifications. The first is a 3SLS 
version of the resource dependence equations that takes advantage of the correlation between the 
error terms in the two stages to produce more efficient results (tables A8 and A9). The results 
from this specification are broadly similar, with a few variables gaining in significance thanks to 
the increased efficiency. A notable exception is coal, which appears to have a negative effect on 
resource dependence in the older period with 2SLS, but is insignificant in the 3SLS version. In 
tables A10 and A11, the 2SLS results for disaggregated resource abundance are repeated using 
the Grubbs maximum normed residual test to eliminate outliers. This test shows a markedly 
greater difference from the preferred specification, but that is not unexpected given that as much 
as one-quarter of the sample is being dropped, as well as the entire coal abundance variable. Oil 
loses significance in all stages and periods, while natural gas and nonfuel minerals become 




This paper makes three contributions to the extensive literature on the resource curse. By 
disaggregating resource abundance into four categories, we see that even within the “point-
resource” umbrella there is substantial variation in the effects of different resources through 
different channels. Although previous papers have looked at different resources, they have 
typically used either a potentially endogenous measure of resource abundance as a share of GDP 
(Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003; Norman 2009) or compared separate regressions each 
with a single resource rather than examining them side-by-side in a single regression where other 
resource types are controlled for (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008). Furthermore, we use modern 
data to compare the most recent time period with the older period, on which most of the 
empirical literature is based. This allows us to evaluate the effectiveness of efforts to alleviate the 
resource curse on an empirical basis, in terms of outcomes for institutions and diversification, as 
well as growth. Combining the two time periods with disaggregated measures of resource 
abundance suggests that countries with specific resources have had different success rates. 
Finally, we update the methodology of resource curse regressions to consider the potential 
endogeneity of conventional resource abundance measures.   15  
Our results are generally in line with the findings of similar papers, in particular the 
conclusion that resource export dependence has no significant empirical effect on growth in an 
instrumental variables set up. The combination of disaggregated resource abundance and the 
before and after comparison give us some new insights into the resource curse, however. Oil 
appears to be the only resource to negatively affect institutions, a finding that is masked by 
aggregate figures. Different resources also seem to have dramatically different effects on 
resource dependence: a natural log increase in oil abundance has an estimated effect on export 
dependence that is five-times greater than a similar increase in metals, for instance, and coal 
abundance might actually be associated with a decrease in resource dependence. Natural gas, on 
the other hand, appears to affect growth through channels other than institutions and export 
dependence. Furthermore, our findings suggest that very little headway has been made in 
dispelling the curse of resources. For most resources, their effect on all three measures under 
consideration is worsened or unchanged in the modern period. The one exception is natural gas, 
which appears to be a curse in the old period but a boon in the new. This result once again 
highlights the importance of differentiating among resource types. The relatively short period 
that has passed since the introduction of policy efforts could be a factor contributing to the 
overall pessimistic picture. 
These findings suggest several avenues for future research. If different resources have 
different effects, it remains to be investigated exactly why. Oil’s strong negative effect on 
institutions might be due to its tendency to be publicly owned, as Quinn and Conway (2007) 
suggest. Public ownership provides increased access by politicians to resource revenue streams, 
increasing the danger of rent-seeking. On the other hand, the curse of oil might be due to 
industrial characteristics like its tendency to employ foreign labor rather than encouraging 
urbanization and investment in local human capital as more labor-intensive industries would. 
The finding that natural gas, in particular, has an effect on growth that is not via either 
institutional quality or export dependence also suggests a question for future research. Two 
channels not explored in this paper are human capital and output volatility, and while they have 
been discussed in the literature they have not been evaluated with respect to an exogenous, 
disaggregated measure of resource abundance.    16  
APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Description of Variables 
Variable Description  Old  New  Source 
Growth Rate, 
growth 
Average of the yearly growth rates in GDP/capita 










Natural log of the dollar value of oil 
reserves/capita, 1971. Based on 2002 proven 
reserves, 1971–2002 production, and 1970 world 
prices. 




Natural log of the dollar value of natural gas 
reserves/capita, 1971. Based on 2002 proven 
reserves, 1971–2002 production, and 1970 world 
prices. 
1971  1971  Norman (2009) and UNSD (for population data) 
Logged Coal 
Abundance 
Natural log of the dollar value of coal 
reserves/capita, 1971. Based on 2002 proven 
reserves, 1971–2002 production, and 1970 world 
prices. 





Natural log of the dollar value of 35 metal and 
mineral reserves/capita, 1970. Based on 2002 
proven reserves, 1970–2002 production, and 1970 
world prices. 





Natural log of the dollar value of oil, natural gas, 
coal, and 35 metal and mineral reserves/capita, 
1970. Based on 2002 proven reserves, 1970–2002 
production, and 1970 world prices. 




GDP share of total yearly fuel and mineral exports 





Old: Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) from WDI, 
PWT 6.1 
New: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2009 
http://stats.unctad.org/Handbook/ and UNSD (for 
GDP figures). 
Rule of Law, 
rule 
Perceptions of the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
1996  1996–
2008 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009). World 






Log of real GDP/capita in 1970.      Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) from Penn 




Gross fixed capital formation as a fraction of GDP, 












Average years of schooling in adults, measured 





















Exports + imports as a fraction of GDP, averaged 









Binary indicator reads 1 for a presidential system, 
0 for parliamentary.  1970 1970 Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) from Beck et al. 
(2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2004) 





Fraction of the population speaking English, 
French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish as their 
first language. 




Four regional dummies for Africa and the Middle 
East, Asia and Oceania Central and South 
America, and North America. The reference region 
is Europe. 
NA  NA  Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008)   17  
Table A2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
  Old New Old New Old New  Old  New 
Growth  1.607 2.309  1.708 1.621  -2.320  -3.887 7.114 8.755 
Logged Oil 
Abundance 
0.432   0.821   0   3.573  
Logged Gas 
Abundance 
0.197   0.424   0   1.883  
Logged Coal 
Abundance 
0.220   0.666   0   3.870  
Logged Nonfuel 
Mineral Abundance 
0.866   1.302   0   5.359  
Logged Aggregate 
Mineral Abundance 
7.078   3.015   -16.393   1.553  
Mineral  Exports  5.990  6.941 9.320  10.528 0.009  0.037  43.737  69.504 
Rule  of  Law  0.198 0.128  1.030 1.023  -1.457  -1.565 2.036 1.949 
Logged GDP/Capita 
1970 
6.927   0.946   5.189   8.677  
Investment  Rate  21.757  21.378 5.649  5.531 8.521  7.365  37.955  40.416 
Average  Education  4.547 5.968  2.743 2.860  0.380 0.730  11.080  12.220 
Average Population 
Growth 
1.954 1.511  1.077 0.964  -0.346  -0.452 3.764 4.615 
Openness  1950–69  0.498   0.346   0.062   2.672  
Presidential  Dummy 0.602   0.492   0   1  
European  Language  0.328   0.420   0   1  
Latitude  0.277   0.193   0.010   0.720  
 
Sample Countries (* for Grubbs Outlier in at least 1 regression) 
Africa and the Middle East: Algeria,* Benin, Botswana,* Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo,* Egypt,* 
Gambia,* Ghana, Iran,* Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho,* Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,* Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic,* Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia,* Zimbabwe* 
Asia and Oceania: Australia,* Bangladesh, China,* Fiji, India, Indonesia,* Japan, Malaysia,* Nepal, New Zealand,* Pakistan, Philippines, 
Singapore,* Sri Lanka, Thailand 
Central and South America: Argentina,* Barbados, Bolivia,* Brazil, Chile,* Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,* El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana,* Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,* Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago,* 
Uruguay, Venezuela* 
North America: Canada,* United States* 
Europe (reference category): Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark,* Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands.* 
Norway,* Poland, Portugal, Romania,* Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom*   18  
 
Table A3: Aggregate Resource Abundance, 1970–1989 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 














Rule of Law, 1996        0.444
a 
(0.27) 
        
Average Mineral Resource 





        









        







        









        









        
Norman Log Value of Fuel Nonfuel 









        








        
Average Gross Fixed Capital 









        










        



















Observations 83  83  89  89 
R
2 0.592  0.525  0.826  0.461 
F-test of Instruments  21.38    2.25   
Anderson Canon. Corr. 

















Endogeneity Test (p-value)    1.60 (0.21)    0.32 (0.57) 
CLR of Endogenous Variable p-
value 
 0.71    0.82 
t statistics in parentheses    * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
a fitted value from previous column 
Robust standard errors used where appropriate      Regional dummies included but not reported   19  
 
Table A4: Aggregate Abundance, 1996–2008 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Exports of Point 
Resources, 
average 1996–












Rule of Law, Average of 1996–2008        1.528
a 
(1.49) 
        
Exports of Point Resources, average 





        







        





        









        









        
Norman Log Value of Fuel Nonfuel 









        








        
Average Fixed Capital Formation, 









        










        



















Observations 85  85  88  88 
R
2 0.507  0.325  0.854  0.285 
F-test of Instruments  9.87    6.09   
Anderson Canon. Corr. 

















Endogeneity Test (p-value)    0.28 (0.60)    0.52 (0.47) 
CLR of Endogenous Variable p-
value 
 0.43    0.16 
t statistics in parentheses    * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
a fitted value from previous column 
Robust standard errors used where appropriate      Regional dummies included but not reported   20  
 
Table A5: Disaggregated Abundance 1970–1989 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 























        
Average Mineral Resource 







        







        





        









        









        










        










        










        










        








        
Average Gross Fixed Capital 









        










        



















Observations  86  86 93 93 
R
2  0.602  0.546 0.824 0.499 
F-test of Instruments  14.72    2.61   
Anderson Canon. Corr. 

















Endogeneity Test (p-value)    0.58 (0.44)    0.67 (0.41) 
CLR of Endogenous Variable p-
value 
  0.88  0.88 
t statistics in parentheses    * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
a fitted value from previous column 
Robust standard errors reported where appropriate      Regional dummies included but not reported   21  
 
Table A6: Disaggregated Abundance 1996–2008 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
  Exports of Point 
Resources, 
Average 1996–












Rule of Law, Average of 1996–2008        1.822**
a 
(2.00) 
        
Exports of Point Resources, average 







        







        





        









        









        










        










        










        










        








        
Average Fixed Capital Formation, 









        










        



















Observations  88  88 91 91 
R
2  0.599  0.383 0.861 0.340 
F-test of Instruments  9.57    7.64   
Anderson Canon. Corr. 

















Endogeneity Test (p-value)    1.44 (0.23)    1.49 (0.22) 
CLR of Endogenous Variable p-
value 
  0.18  0.06 
t statistics in parentheses    * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
a fitted value from previous column 
Robust standard errors used where appropriate      Regional dummies included but not reported   22  
 
Table A7: Change over Time in the Effect of Resource Abundance 
 
  Resource Dependence  Growth from Resource 
Dependence 
Institutional Quality  Growth from 
Institutional Quality 
Aggregated Unchanged  Unchanged Worsened*  Unchanged 
Oil Worsened**  Unchanged  Unchanged Unchanged 
Natural Gas  Improved*  Improved*** Unchanged  Improved** 
Coal Worsened**  Unchanged  Unchanged  Unchanged 
Non-fuel Unchanged  Unchanged Worsened**  Unchanged 
Wald test of the simple linear hypothesis that the corresponding coefficients in tables A3-6 are the same.   
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 





Table A8: 3SLS for 1970–1989 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
















Average Mineral Resource 







      










      










      










      










      
Norman Log Value of Fuel 










Observations  86 86 83 83 
R
2  0.602 0.551 0.592 0.539 
t statistics in parentheses    * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01    
a fitted value from previous column 
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Table A9: 3SLS for 1996–2008 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Exports of Point 
Resources, 
Average 1996–





Exports of Point 
Resources, 
Average 1996–





Exports of Point Resources, 







      










      










      










      










      
Norman Log Value of Fuel 










Observations  88 88 85 85 
R
2  0.599 0.335 0.507 0.317 
t statistics in parentheses    * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01   
a fitted value from previous column 
Instruments and controls included but not reported   24  
 
Table A10: Disaggregated Abundance 1970–1989 with Grubbs 
















Rule of Law, 1996        0.628
a 
(0.66) 
       
Average Mineral Resource 





       










       










       










Observations  65 59 69 68 
R
2  0.332 0.689 0.852 0.655 
F-test  of  Instruments  3.86  4.99  
Anderson Canon. Corr. 

















Endogeneity Test (p-value)    0.01 (0.92)    0.16 (0.69) 
CLR of Endogenous Variable p-value    0.76    0.55 
t statistics in parentheses    * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01   
a fitted value from previous column 
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Table A11: Disaggregated Abundance 1996–2008 with Grubbs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
















Rule of Law, Average of 1996–008        0.750
a 
(0.98) 
       
Exports of Point Resources, Average 





       










       










       










Observations  59 58 64 63 
R
2  0.489 0.475 0.902 0.446 
F-test of Instruments  2.59    10.14   
Anderson Canon. Corr. 

















Endogeneity Test (p-value)    0.79 (0.37)    0.01 (0.93) 
CLR of Endogenous Variable p-value    0.37    0.34 
t statistics in parentheses    * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01   
a fitted value from previous column 
Robust standard errors used where appropriate    Instruments and controls included but not reported   26  
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